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Abstract
To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing
players in the hope of successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible to act as
strategy sources is bounded to the immediate neighbors of each individual. But which one of these strategy sources should
potentially be copied? Previous research dealt with this question either by selecting the fittest or by selecting one player
uniformly at random. Here we introduce a parameter u that interpolates between these two extreme options. Setting u
equal to zero returns the random selection of the opponent, while positive u favor the fitter players. In addition, we divide
the population into two groups. Players from group A select their opponents as dictated by the parameter u, while players
from group B do so randomly irrespective of u. We denote the fraction of players contained in groups A and B by v and
1{v, respectively. The two parameters u and v allow us to analyze in detail how aspirations in the context of the prisoner’s
dilemma game influence the evolution of cooperation. We find that for sufficiently positive values of u there exist a robust
intermediate v&0:5 for which cooperation thrives best. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels
of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process K and for different interaction networks. We also provide complete phase
diagrams depicting the dependence of the impact of u and v for different values of K, and contrast the validity of our
conclusions by means of an alternative model where individual aspiration levels are subject to evolution as well. Our study
indicates that heterogeneity in aspirations may be key for the sustainability of cooperation in structured populations.
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Introduction
Understanding the evolution of cooperation among selfish
individuals in human and animal societies remains a grand
challenge across disciplines. Evolutionary games are employed
frequently as the theoretical framework of choice in order to
interpret the emergence and survival of cooperative behavior
[1–6]. The prisoner’s dilemma game, in particular, has attracted
considerable interest [7–11] as the essential yet minimalist
example of a social dilemma. In the original two-person one-shot
game the two players have two strategies to choose from
(cooperation and defection), and their payoffs depend on the
simultaneous decision of both. If they choose to cooperate they
will receive the highest collective payoff, which will be shared
equally among them. Mutual defection, on the other hand, yields
the lowest collective payoff. Yet to defect is tempting because it
yields a higher individual payoff regardless of the opponent’s
decision. It is thus frequently so that both players choose not to
cooperate, thus procreating the inevitable social dilemma. In
reality, however, interactions may be repeated and the
reputation of players compromised [12,13]. Additionally,
individuals may alter with whom they interact [14], and different
behaviors may be expressed when participants in a social
interaction occupy different roles [15–18]. Such and similar
considerations have been very successful in elucidating why the
unadorned scenario of total defection is often at odds with reality
[19], where it is clear that both humans and animals cooperate to
achieve what would be impossible by means of isolated efforts.
Mechanisms supporting cooperation identified thus far include
kin selection [20] as well as many others [6,21–23], and there is
progress in place aimed at unifying some of these approaches
[24,25].
Probably the most vibrant of all in recent years have been
advances building on the seminal paper by Nowak and May [26],
who showed that spatial structure may sustain cooperation without
the aid of additional mechanisms or strategic complexity.
Although in part anticipated by Hamilton’s comments on viscous
populations [20], it was fascinating to discover that structured
populations, including complex and social networks [27–29],
provide an optimal playground for the pursuit of cooperation.
Notably, a simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs
and social networks is that natural selection favors cooperation if
b=cwk, where b is the benefit of the altruistic act, c is its cost,
while k is the average number of neighbors [30]. This is similar to
Hamilton’s rule stating that c=b should be larger than the
coefficient of genetic relatedness between individuals [20]. In fact,
on graphs and social networks the evolution of altruism can thus
be fully explained by the inclusive fitness theory since the
population is structured such that interactions are between genetic
relatives on average [25,31,32].
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 December 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 12 | e15117According to the ‘‘best takes all’’ rule [33,34] players are
allowed to adopt the strategy of one of their neighbors, provided its
payoff is higher than that from the other neighbors as well as from
the player aspiring to improve by changing its strategy. Based on
this relatively simple setup, it was shown that on a square lattice
cooperators form compact clusters and so protect themselves
against being exploited by defectors. The ‘‘best takes all’’ strategy
adoption rule is, however, just one of the many possible
alternatives that were considered in the past. Other examples
include the birth-death and imitation rule [35], the proportional
imitation rule [36], the reinforcement learning adoption rule [37],
or the Fermi-function based strategy adoption rule [38]. The latter
received substantial attention, particularly in the physics commu-
nity, for its compatibility with the Monte Carlo simulation
procedure and the straightforward adjustment of the level of
uncertainty governing the strategy adoptions K. However, with
this rule the potential donor of the new strategy is selected
uniformly at random from all the neighbors. This is somewhat
untrue to what can be observed in reality, where in fact individuals
typically aspire to their most successful neighbors rather than just
somebody random. In this sense the ‘‘best takes all’’ rule seems
more appropriate, although it fails to account for errors in
judgment, uncertainty, external factors, and other disturbances
that may vitally affect how we evaluate and see our co-players.
Here we therefore propose a simple tunable function that
interpolates between the ‘‘best takes all’’ and the random selection
of a neighbor in a smooth fashion by means of a single parameter
u. In this sense the parameter u acts as an aspiration parameter,
determining to what degree neighbors with a higher payoff will be
considered more likely as potential strategy sources than other
(randomly selected) neighbors.
Aiming to further disentangle the role of aspirations, we also
consider two types of players, denoted by type A and B,
respectively. While players of type A conform to the aspirations
imposed by the value of the aspiration parameter u, type B players
choose whom to potentially copy uniformly at random irrespective
of u. We denote the fraction of type A and B players by v and
1{v, respectively. This additional division of players into two
groups is motivated by the overwhelming evidence indicating that
heterogeneity, almost irrespective of its origin, promotes cooper-
ative actions. Most notably associated with this statement are
complex networks, including small-world networks [39–41],
random regular graphs [5,42], scale-free networks [43–48], as
well as adaptive and growing networks [49–56]. Furthermore, we
follow the work by McNamara et al. on the coevolution of
choosiness and cooperation [57], in particular by omitting the
separation of the population on two types of players and
introducing the heterogeneity by means of normally distributed
individual aspiration levels that are then also subject to evolution.
At present, we thus investigate how aspirations on an individual
level affect the evolution of cooperation. Having something to
aspire to is crucial for progress and betterment. But how high
should we set our goals? Should our role models be only
overachievers and sports heroes, or is it perhaps better to aspire
to achieving somewhat more modest goals? Here we address these
questions in the context of the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
game and determine just how strong and how widespread
aspirations should be for cooperation to thrive best. As we will
show, a strong drive to excellence in the majority of the population
may in fact act detrimental on the evolution of cooperation, while
on the other hand, properly spread and heterogeneous aspirations
may be just the key to fully eliminating the defectors. We will show
that this holds irrespective of the structure of the underlying
interaction network, as well as irrespective of the level of
uncertainty by strategy adoptions K. In addition, the presented
results will be contrasted with the output of a simple coevolution-
ary model, where individual aspirations will also be subject to
evolution by means of natural selection. We will conclude that
appropriately tuned aspirations may be seen as a universally
applicable promoter of cooperation, which will hopefully inspire
new studies along this line of research.
Results
Depending on the interaction network, the strategy adoption
rule and other simulation details (see e.g. [4,6,23,58]), there always
exists a critical cost-to-benefit ratio r~rc at which cooperators in
the prisoner’s dilemma die out. This is directly related to
Hamilton’s rule stating that natural selection favors cooperation
if c=b is larger than the coefficient of genetic relatedness between
individuals [20]. If the aspiration parameter u~0 (note that then
the division of players to those of type A and those of type B is
irrelevant), K~0:1, and the interaction network is a square lattice,
then, in our case, rc~0:022. In what follows, we will typically set r
slightly below this threshold to 0:02 and examine how different
values of u, v, K, as well as different interaction networks influence
the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game.
It is instructive to first examine characteristic snapshots of the
square lattice for different values of u and v. Results presented in
Fig. 1 hint to the conclusion that heterogenous aspiration to the
fittest promotes cooperation, although the details of this claim
depend somewhat on the value of the aspiration parameter u. For
small values of u it is best if all the players, i.e. v~1, aspire to their
slightly (note that u is small) fitter neighbors and thus none actually
choose the potential strategy sources uniformly at random. This
can be deduced from the top three panels of Fig. 1 if compared
from left to right. For large u, however, it is best if only half of the
players, i.e. v&0:5, aspire to their most fittest neighbors, while the
other half chooses their role models randomly. This can be
observed if one compares the bottom three panels of Fig. 1 with
one another, although the difference in the overall density of
cooperators (depicted green and blue) between the middle and the
right panel is fairly small. Finally, the role of the aspiration
parameter is more clear cut since larger u clearly favor the
cooperative strategy if compared to small u. This can be observed
if comparing the snapshots presented in Fig. 1 vertically.
Since the snapshots presented in Fig. 1 can be used primarily for
an initial qualitative assessment of the impact of heterogeneous
aspirations, we present in Fig. 2 the fraction of cooperators rC (left)
and the critical cost-to-benefit ratio rc (right) in dependence on v
for different values of u. It can be observed that the promotion of
cooperation for the optimal combination of the two parameters,
being u~1 and v&0:5, is really remarkable. The fraction of
cooperators rises from 0:18 to 0:87, while the critical cost-to-
benefit ratio rises a full order of magnitude from rc~0:022 to 0:31.
As tentatively deduced from the lower three snapshots in Fig. 1, it
can also be observed that for high values of u an intermediate
fraction of type A players is optimal for the evolution of
cooperation. Conversely, for low u the fraction of cooperators
rC and the critical cost-to-benefit ratio rc both increase
monotonously with increasing v. If, however, selecting a particular
value of v, then the impact of the aspiration parameter u is always
such that cooperation is the more promoted the larger the value of
u. This can be observed clearly from both panels, and indeed
seems like the main driving force behind the elevated levels of
cooperation. Fine-tuning the fraction of players making use of the
aspiration to the fittest (from v~1 downwards since the v~0 limit
trivially returns the random selection of potential strategy sources)
Heterogeneous Aspirations Promote Cooperation
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sense of minor adjustments, similarly as was observed in the past
for the impact of uncertainty by strategy adoptions [42] or the
impact of noise [59].
Aiming to generalize the validity of our results, we present in
Fig. 3 the fraction of cooperators rC in dependence on v for
different values of u as obtained on the random regular graph (left)
and the small-world network (right). The goal is to test to what
extend above conclusions hold also on interaction networks other
than the square lattice, in particular such that are more complex
and spatially heterogenous. If comparing the obtained results with
those presented in the left panel of Fig. 2, it seems save to conclude
that they are to a very large degree qualitatively identical. Some
differences nevertheless can be observed. The first is that what
constitutes a high u limit is a bit higher on complex networks than
on the regular lattice. Note that for u~0:5 the optimal fraction of
type A players is practically still v?1. Even for u~1:0 the bell-
shaped dependence on v is far less pronounced than on the square
lattice, and the optimal v (the peak of rC) is closer to 0:6 than 0:5.
The second difference is, looking relatively to the starting point at
u~v~0, that the promotion of cooperation due to positive u and
v is somewhat less prolific. This is, however, not that surprising
since complex networks in general promote cooperation already
on their own [6], and thus secondary promotive mechanisms may
therefore become less expressed. Aside from these fairly mild
differences though, we can conclude that heterogenous aspirations
do promote cooperation irrespective of the underlying interaction
network, and that the details of the promotive effect are largely
universal and predictable.
Next, we proceed with examining how positive values of u and v
fare under different levels of uncertainty by strategy adoptions.
The latter can be tuned via K [see Eq. (3)], which acts as a
temperature parameter in the employed Fermi strategy adoption
function [38]. Accordingly, when K?? all information is lost and
the strategies are adopted by means of a coin toss. Note that this
aspect has thus far not received any attention here as K~0:1 was
fixed. The matter is not trivial to address because uncertainty and
noise can have a rather profound impact on the evolution of
cooperation [40,42,59–62], and thus care needs to be exercised.
The safest and most accurate way to approach the problem is by
means of phase diagrams. Since we have two additional
parameters (u and v) against which we want to test the impact
of K, we determined full r{K phase diagrams for six
characteristic combinations of u and v on the square lattice.
Figure 1. Characteristic snapshots of strategy distributions on the square lattice. Top row depicts results for the aspiration parameter
u~0:25 while the bottom row features results for u~1:0. In both rows the fraction of type A players v is 0:05, 0:5 and 1:0 from left to right.
Cooperators of type A and B are colored green and blue, respectively. Defectors of type A and B, on the other hand, are colored red and yellow. If
comparing the snapshots vertically, it can be observed that larger values of u (top 0:25, bottom 1:0) clearly promote the evolution of cooperation. The
scenario from left to right via increasing the fraction of type A players is not so clear cut. For u~0:25 (top row) we can conclude that larger v favor
cooperative behavior, as clearly the cooperators flourish more and more from the left toward the right panel. For u~1:0 (bottom row), however, it
seems that for v~0:5 (bottom middle) cooperators actually fare better then for both v~0:05 (bottom left) and v~1:0 (bottom right). Hence, the
conclusion imposes that for higher u values an intermediate (rather than the maximal, as is the case for lower u) fraction of type A players (those that
aspire to their most fittest neighbors only) is optimal for the evolution of cooperation. Results in all panels were obtained for r~0:02 and K~0:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015117.g001
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diagram presented in the top left panel of Fig. 4 is well-known,
implying the existence of an optimal level of uncertainty for the
evolution of cooperation, as was previously reported in [42,59]. In
particular, note that the D<CzD transition line is bell shaped,
indicating that K&0:38 is the optimal temperature at which
cooperators are able to survive at the highest value of r.
Importantly though, this phenomenon can only be observed on
interaction topologies lacking overlapping triangles [63,64].
Interestingly, increasing u from 0:25 (top row) to 1:0 (bottom
row) completely eradicates (as do interaction networks incorpo-
rating overlapping triangles) the existence of an optimal K, and in
fact qualitatively reverses the dependence. The D<CzD
transition line has an inverted bell-shaped outlay, indicating the
Figure 2. Promotion of cooperation due to heterogenous aspirations on the square lattice. Left panel depicts the density of cooperators
rC in dependence on the fraction of type A players v for different values of the aspiration parameter u. Right panel depicts the critical cost-to-benefit
ratio r~rc at which cooperators die out, i.e. rC~0, in dependence on v for different values of u. Results in both panels convey the message that low
values of u require a high fraction of type A players for cooperation to flourish. Conversely, higher values of u sustain cooperation optimally if only
half (v&0:5) of the players aspires to their most fittest neighbors while the rest chooses whom to potentially imitate uniformly at random. Optimal
conditions for the evolution of cooperation thus require u and v to be fine-tuned jointly. Depicted results in both panels were obtained for r~0:02
and K~0:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015117.g002
Figure 3. Promotion of cooperation due to heterogenous aspirations on the random regular graph (RRG) and the small-world (SW)
network. Left panel depicts the density of cooperators rC in dependence on the fraction of type A players v for different values of the aspiration
parameter u for the RRG. Right panel depicts rC in dependence on v for different values of u for the Watts-Strogatz SW network with the fraction of
rewired links equalling 0:1. These results are in agreement with those presented in Fig. 2, supporting the conclusion that the impact of heterogenous
aspirations on the evolution of cooperation is robust against alterations of the interaction network. As on the square lattice, low, but also
intermediate, values of u require v~1:0 for cooperation to thrive, while higher values of u sustain cooperation optimally only if v&0:6. Depicted
results in both panels were obtained for r~0:02 and K~0:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015117.g003
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the evolution of cooperation. The qualitative changes are less
profound if u is kept constant at 0:25 (top row) and v increases
(from left to right). Still, however, the bell-shaped outlay of the
D<CzD transition gives way to a monotonically increasing
curve, saturating only for high K. These qualitative changes in the
phase diagrams imply that increasing the aspiration parameter u
or the fraction of players abiding to it (type A) effectively alters the
interaction network. While the square lattice obviously lacks
overlapping triangles and thus enables the observation of an
optimal K for small enough values of u and v (or a combination
thereof, as is the case in the top left panels), trimming the
likelihood of who will act as a strategy source and how many
players will actually aspire to their fittest neighbors seems to
effectively enhance linkage among essentially disconnected triplets
and thus precludes the same observation. It is instructive to note
that a similar phenomenon was observed recently in public goods
games, where the joint membership in large groups was also found
to alter the effective interaction network and thus the impact of
uncertainly on the evolution of cooperation [64].
In terms of the facilitation of cooperation, however, it can be
concluded that the promotive impact of positive values of u and v
prevails irrespective of K. By comparing the extend of pure C and
mixed CzD regions for different pairs of the two parameters, we
can observe that for small values of u (top panels in Fig. 4) it is best
if all the players, i.e. v~1, aspire to their slightly (note that u is
small) fitter neighbors, while for large u (bottom panels in Fig. 4) it
is best if only approximately half of the players, i.e. v&0:5, aspire
to their most fittest neighbors. The same conclusions were stated
already upon the inspection of results presented in Figs. 2 and 3,
and with this we now affirm that not only is the promotion of
cooperation via heterogeneous aspirations robust against differ-
ences in the interaction networks, but also against variations in the
uncertainty by strategy adoptions.
It remains of interest to elucidate why then cooperative
behavior is in fact promoted by positive values of u and v.T o
provide answers, we show in Fig. 5 time courses of rC for different
characteristic combination of the two main parameters that we
have used throughout this work. What should attract the attention
is the fact that in the most early stages of the evolutionary process
(note that values of rC were recorded also in-between full iteration
steps) it appears as if defectors would actually fare better than
cooperators. This is actually what one would expect, given that
defectors are, as individuals, more successful than cooperators and
will thus be chosen more likely as potential strategy donors if u is
positive. This should in turn amplify their chances of spreading
Figure 4. Full r{K phase diagrams for the square lattice. Top row depicts results for the aspiration parameter u~0:25 while the bottom row
features results for u~1:0. In both rows the fraction of type A players v is 0:05, 0:5 and 1:0 from left to right. The outline of panels thus corresponds
to the snapshots presented in Fig. 1. Thin blue and thick red lines mark the border between stationary pure C and D phases and the mixed CzD
phase, respectively. In agreement with previous works [42,63], it can be observed that for u~0:25 and v~0:05 (top left) there exists an intermediate
uncertainty in the strategy adoption process (an intermediate value of K) for which the survivability of cooperators is optimal, i.e. rc is maximal.
Conversely, while the borderline separating the pure C and the mixed CzD phase for all the other combinations of u and v exhibits a qualitatively
identical outlay as for the u~0:25 and v~0:05 case, the D<CzD transition is qualitatively different and very much dependent on the particularities
players’ aspirations. Note that in all the bottom panels there exist an intermediate value of K for which rc is minimal rather than maximal, while
towards the large K limit rc increases, saturating only for Kw4 (not shown). In the top middle and right panel, on the other hand, the bell-shaped
outlay of the D<CzD transition gives way to a monotonically increasing curve, again saturating only for Kw4. It can thus be concluded that, while
the aspiration based promotion of cooperation is largely independent of K, the details of phase transition are very much affected, which can be
attributed to an effective alterations of the interaction network due to preferred strategy sources (see also main text for details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015117.g004
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only between 20–30% survive). Quite surprisingly though, the tide
changes fairly fast, and as one can observe from the presented time
courses, frequently the more so the deeper the initial downfall of
cooperators. We argue that for positive values of u and v a negative
feedback effect occurs, which halts and eventually reverts what
appears to be a march of defectors toward dominance. Namely, in
the very early stages of the game defectors are able to plunder very
efficiently, which quickly results in a state where there are hardly
any cooperators left to exploit. Consequently, the few remaining
clusters of cooperators start recovering lost ground against
weakened defectors. Crucial thereby is the fact that the clusters
formed by cooperators are impervious to defector attacks even at
high values of r because of the positive selection towards the fittest
neighbors acting as strategy sources (occurring for uw0). In a sea
of cooperators this is practically always another cooperator rather
than a defector trying to penetrate into the cluster. This newly
identified mechanism ultimately results in fairly widespread
cooperation that goes beyond what can be warranted by the
spatial reciprocity alone (see e.g. [6]), and this irrespective of the
underlying interaction network and uncertainty by strategy
adoptions.
Finally, it is instructive to examine whether an optimal
intermediate value of wx, determining the aspiration level of
player x, can emerge spontaneously from an initial array of
normally distributed values. This would imply that natural
selection indeed favors individuals with a specific aspiration level,
which would in turn extend the credibility of thus far presented
results that were obtained primarily in a top-down manner [by
optimizing a population-level property (cooperation) by means of
an appropriate selection of parameters determining the aspiration
level of individuals]. For this purpose we omit the division of the
population on players of type A and B, and initially assign to every
player a value wx that is drawn randomly from a Gaussian
distribution with a given mean m and standard deviation s. Then if
player x adopts the strategy from player y also wx becomes equal
to wy (see Methods for details). Results obtained with this
alternative coevolutionary model are presented in Fig. 6. It can
be observed that the initial Gaussian distribution sharpens fast
around an intermediate value of w, which then gradually becomes
more and more frequent in the population as the natural selection
spontaneously eliminates the less favorable values that warrant a
lower individual fitness. The final state is a population where
virtually all players have an identical aspiration level wx~w, and
accordingly, the outcome in terms of the stationary density of
cooperators is equal to that obtained with the original model
having v~1 and u~w. In this sense the preceding results are
validated and their generality extended by means of a bottom-up
approach entailing a spontaneous coevolution towards an
intermediate individually optimal aspiration level. We note,
however, that with this simple coevolutionary model the result
that heterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation is not exactly
reproduced. Further studies on more sophisticated models
incorporating coevolving aspirations are required to arrive
spontaneously at a heterogeneous distribution of individual
aspiration levels. Inspirations for this can be found in the recent
Figure 5. Time courses of the density of cooperators on the
square lattice. Results are presented for the aspiration parameters
u~0:25 (solid lines) and u~1:0 (dashed lines), each for three different
fractions of type A players v, as depicted on the figure. The crucial
feature of all time courses is the initial temporary downfall of
cooperators, which sets in for all depicted combinations of u and v.
Quite remarkably, what appears to become an ever faster extinction
eventually becomes a rise to, at least in some cases, near-dominance.
Note that the horizontal axis is logarithmic and that values of rC were
recorded also in-between full iteration steps to ensure a proper
resolution. Depicted results were obtained for r~0:02 and K~0:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015117.g005
Figure 6. Spontaneous fixation towards an intermediate
aspiration level by means of natural selection. Presented results
were obtained with the alternative model where players are not divided
into two groups and initially every player is assigned a random
aspiration level wx drawn from a Gaussian distribution with the mean
m~0:5 and standard deviation s~0:167. The main panel depicts the
distributions W(w) of individual aspiration levels as recorded at 4 (solid
black line), 32 (dashed red line) and 256 (dotted green line) full iteration
steps. The fixation towards a dominant average value u~L{2 P
x wx
due to natural selection is evident since the interval of w values still
present in the population becomes more and more narrow as time
progresses. The inset shows the convergence of u (solid gray line) and
rC (dotted blue line). The initial temporary downfall of cooperators,
followed by the rise to near-dominance, is well-expressed also in the
coevolutionary setup, and the stationary density agrees well with the
results obtained by means of the original model with v~1:0 and u~1:0
(compare with the dashed cyan line in Fig. 5). Note that in the inset the
horizontal axis is logarithmic and that values of u and rC were recorded
also in-between full iteration steps to ensure a proper resolution.
Depicted results were obtained for r~0:02 and K~0:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015117.g006
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to further developments in this direction.
Discussion
We have shown that heterogenous aspiration to the fittest, i.e.
the propensity of designating the most successful neighbor as being
the role model, may be seen as a universally applicable promoter
of cooperation that works on different interaction networks and
under different levels of stochasticity. For low and moderate values
of the aspiration parameter u cooperation thrives best if the total
population abides to aspiring to the fittest. For large values of u,
however, it is best if only approximately half of the players
persuasively attempt to copy their most successful neighbors while
the rest chooses their opponents uniformly at random. The
optimal evolution of cooperation thus requires fine-tuning of both,
the density of players that are prone to aspiring to the fittest, as
well as the aspiration parameter that determines how fit a
neighbor actually must be in order to be considered as the
potential source of the new strategy. In addition, by studying an
alternative model where individual aspiration levels were also
subject to evolution, we have shown that an intermediate value of
the aspiration level emerges spontaneously through natural
selection, thus supplementing the main results by means of a
coevolutionary approach.
Notably, the extensions of the prisoner’s dilemma game we have
considered here seem very reasonable and are in fact easily
justifiable with realistic examples. For example, it is a fact that
people will, in general, much more likely follow a successful
individual than somebody who is just struggling to get by. Under
certain adverse circumstances, like in a state of rebelion or in
revolutionary times, however, it is also possible that individuals will
be inspired to copy their less successful partners or those that seem
to do more harm than good. In many ways it seems that the ones
who are satisfied with just picking somebody randomly to aspire to
are the ones that are most difficult to come by. In this sense the
rather frequently adopted random selection of a neighbor,
retrieved in our case if u~0 (or equivalently v~0), seems in
many ways like the least probable alternative. In this sense it is
interesting to note that our aspiring to the fittest becomes identical
to the frequently adopted, especially in the early seminal works on
games on grids [26,33,34], ‘‘best takes all’’ adoption rule if v~1,
u?? in Eq. (2), and K?0 in Eq. (3). Although in our simulations
we never quite reach the ‘‘best takes all’’ limit, and thus a direct
comparison with the seminal works is somewhat circumstantial, we
find here that the intermediate regions of heterogenous aspirations
offer fascinating new insights into the evolution of cooperation,
and we hope that this work will inspire future studies, especially in
terms of understanding the emergence of successful leaders in
societies via a coevolutionary process [23].
Methods
An evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with the temptation
to defect T~b (the highest payoff received by a defector if playing
against a cooperator), reward for mutual cooperation R~b{c,
the punishment for mutual defection P~0, and the sucker’s payoff
S~{c (the lowest payoff received by a cooperator if playing
against a defector) is used as the basis for our simulations. Without
loss of generality the payoffs can be rescaled as R~1, T~1zr,
S~{r and P~0, where r~c=(b{c) is the cost-to-benefit ratio
[5]. For positive r we have TwRwPwS, thus strictly satisfying
the prisoner’s dilemma payoff ranking.
As the interaction network, we use either a regular L|L square
lattice, the random regular graph (RRG) constructed as described
in [65], or the small-world (SW) topology with an average degree
of four generated via the Watts-Strogatz algorithm [66]. Each
vertex x is initially designated as hosting either players of type
nx~A or B with the probability v and 1{v, respectively. This
division of players is performed uniformly at random irrespective
of their initial strategies and remains unchanged during the
simulations. According to established procedures, each player is
initially also designated either as a cooperator (sx~C) or defector
(D) with equal probability. The game is iterated forward in
accordance with the sequential simulation procedure comprising
the following elementary steps. First, player x acquires its payoff px
by playing the game with all its neighbors. Next, we evaluate in the
same way the payoffs of all the neighbors of player x and
subsequently select one neighbor y via the probability
Py~
exp wypy
  
P
z exp wzpz ðÞ
, ð1Þ
where the sum runs over all the neighbors of player x.
Importantly, wx is the so-called selection or aspiration parameter
that depends on the type of player x according to
wx~
u,i f nx~A
0, if nx~B:
 
ð2Þ
Evidently, if the aspiration parameter u~0 then irrespective of v
(density of type A players) the most frequently adopted situation is
recovered where player y is chosen uniformly at random from all
the neighbors of player x. For uw0 and vw0, however, Eqs. (1)
and (2) introduce a preference in all players of type A (but not in
players of type B) to copy the strategy of those neighbors who have
a high fitness, or equivalently, a high payoff py. Lastly then, after
the neighbor y that is aspired to by player x is chosen, player x
adopts the strategy sy from the selected player y with the
probability
Ws y?sx
  
~
1
1zexp px{py
  
=K
   , ð3Þ
where K denotes the amplitude of noise or its inverse (1=K) the
so-called intensity of selection [38]. Irrespective of the values of u
and v one full iteration step involves all players x~1,2,...,L2
having a chance to adopt a strategy from one of their neighbors
once.
An alternative model, allowing for individual wx values to be
subject to evolution as well, entails omitting the division of the
population on two types of players and assigning to every
individual an initial wx value that is drown randomly from a
Gaussian distribution having mean m and standard deviation s,a s
was done recently in [57], for example. Subsequently, if player x
adopts the strategy from player y following the identical procedure
as described above for the original model, then the value of wx
changes to that of wy as well. The key question that we aim to
answer with this model is whether a specific aspiration level is
indeed optimal for an individual to prosper, and if yes, does the
selection pressure favor it spontaneously. Essentially, we are
interested in the distribution of wx values after the stationary
fraction of strategies in the population is reached. A link with the
original model can be established by considering in this case v to
equal one and u~L{2 P
x wx.
Heterogeneous Aspirations Promote Cooperation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 December 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 12 | e15117Results of computer simulations were obtained on populations
comprising 100|100 to 400|400 individuals, whereby the
fraction of cooperators rC was determined within 105 full iteration
steps after sufficiently long transients were discarded. Moreover,
since the heterogeneous preferential selection of neighbors may
introduce additional disturbances, final results were averaged over
up to 40 independent runs for each set of parameter values in
order to assure suitable accuracy.
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